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A
bstract
In
this
paper
w
e
describe
a
secu
rity
architecture
for
Jini
services.
The
cu
rrentJini
A
PI
and
its
im
plem
entations
do
n
othandle
any
secu
rity
aspects.
In
an
open
and
distrib
uted
en
vironm
entlik
e
the
Internet,
m
any
attacks
can
be
started
o
rJini
services
can
be
ab
u
sed.
O
n
the
otherhand,Jav
a
–
the
program
m
ing
language
w
hich
Jiniis
m
ade
of
–
pro
vides
so
m
e
secu
rity
co
n
cepts.
W
e
sho
w
ho
w
a
strong
authentication
and
authorization
architecture
forJini
w
ith
a
secu
re
co
m
m
u
nication
channel
can
be
The
m
ain
part
of
the
w
o
rk
o
n
this
research
topic
has
been
done
during
a
research
stay
of
the
authors
atthe
InternationalCom
puterScience
Institute(ICSI)in
B
erkeley
,California.
realized
by
u
sing
existing
Jav
a
technology
and
w
ithout
any
m
odifications
of
the
Jini
A
PI.
1
Introduction
Itislik
ely
that
w
e
w
ill
see
an
otherparadigm
shiftin
the
field
of
co
m
puter
science
in
the
n
earfuture.
Starting
from
a
centralized
m
ainfram
e
o
riented
approach,the
m
ain
co
m
puting
paradigm
has
shifted
to
a
Client/Serv
er
approach
so
m
e
15
years
ago.The
n
extlogical
step
w
ill
co
n
sist
ofbillions
of
sm
all,
autonom
ousdevicesim
plem
enting
a
rich
set
of
services
that
w
illbe
equipped
w
ith
spontaneous
n
etw
o
rking
capabilities
and
hav
e
access
to
any
inform
ation
and
pro
vide
access
to
any
service
“o
n
the
n
et”.
B
usiness
processes
w
ithin
a
co
m
pany
o
rbetw
een
a
supplier
and
its
cu
stom
ers
can
also
be
m
odeled
as
co
operating
services
o
n
the
n
et.
These
services
require
a
distrib
uted
co
m
m
u
nication
infrastructure.
A
co
m
m
u
ni-
cation
infrastructure
acts
as
a
m
iddlew
are
layer
betw
een
the
operating
system
and
the
application.Its
task
is
to
pro
vide
functionslik
e
service
disco
v
ery
and
brok
erage,
v
ery
sim
ilar
to
a
m
ark
etplace
in
a
classic
co
m
m
erce
scen
ario,
w
here
m
ark
eters
and
cu
stom
ers
can
m
eet
and
trade.
A
m
ong
otherduties,
m
iddlew
are
can
lev
erage
these
co
n
cepts
of
classic
co
m
m
erce
to
e-co
m
m
erce.
Jini[2
,12
,9],a
technology
from
Sun
M
icrosystem
s,is
o
n
e
of
sev
eral
approachesto
pro
vide
a
m
iddlew
are
for
service
disco
v
ery
and
brok
erage.A
Jini
service
that
w
ants
to
pro
vide
its
funcionality
has
to
registeritself
w
ith
a
so
-called
lookup
service.
F
o
r
that,ithands
o
v
er
a
service
proxy
to
the
lookup
service.A
service
proxy
is
a
regular
Jav
a
objectthathandles
the
co
m
m
u
nication
betw
een
a
client
application
and
the
Jini
service.
O
n
the
other
hand,
a
Jini
client
that
n
eeds
a
Jini
service,firstqueries
the
lookup
servicefor
an
appropriate
service.If
an
appriopiateJini
serviceisfound
by
the
lookup
service,the
co
rresponding
service
proxy
is
returned.
From
that
m
o
m
ent,
all
co
m
m
u
nication
betw
een
the
Jini
client
and
the
Jini
service
ishandled
by
the
service
proxy
w
ithoutfurther
participation
of
the
lookup
service.
A
nother
k
ey
co
n
cept
of
Jiniis
the
self-healing
ability
thatfits
v
ery
good
into
spontaneous
n
etw
o
rks,
w
here
1
appliances
appear
and
disappear
w
ithout
n
otification,
so
thatthe
selfhealing
ability
doesim
plicitly
the
clean-up
of
n
o
longer
u
sed
reso
u
rces.
H
o
w
ev
er
,Jini
does
n
ot
pro
vide
any
secu
rity
m
echanism
s
that
are
cru
cial
to
e-
co
m
m
erce
applications
w
hich
rely
o
n
co
nfidentiality
and
integrity
.
This
paper
presents
a
solution
to
the
follo
w
ing
three
problem
s:

Jini’s
lookup
service
lacks
a
sophisticated
secu
rity
m
odel.
A
s
a
co
n
sequence,
each
Jini
client
can
get
a
service
proxy
and
each
Jini
service
can
register
and
ev
en
re-register
o
n
the
lookup
service
w
ithout
restrictions.
The
re-registration
opens
the
doorfor
“m
an
in
the
m
iddle
attacks”.
The
“m
an
-
in-the-m
iddle-service”has
o
nly
to
re-registeritsproxy
w
ith
the
sam
eService-ID
as
the
o
riginal
service,hence
replacing
the
w
ell-behaving
serviceby
a
m
alicious
o
n
e.A
clientis
u
n
aw
are
of
that
change,because
the
m
an
-in-the-m
iddle-service
pro
vides
the
sam
e
A
PIlik
e
the
o
riginal
service.
F
o
r
ex
am
ple,
m
alicious
co
m
-
petitors
co
uld
replace
your
service
proxy
w
ith
their
o
w
n
o
n
e
and
allyour
clients
w
illbe
redirected
to
them
,
so
thatyour
rev
en
u
es
w
ill
shrink.

Jinilacks
service
authentication
and
authorization
m
echanism
s:
suppose
a
bank
pro
vides
an
e-banking
service
that
offers
you
access
to
your
acco
u
nt.
N
othing
prev
entsyour
colleague
to
callthe
creditT
ran
sfer
-m
ethod
o
n
your
acco
u
nt.

Jini
also
has
to
cope
w
ith
a
general
secu
rity
problem
,
n
am
ely
sniffing
o
n
the
n
et.
Ev
ery
n
etw
o
rk
package
in
the
Internet
can
potentially
be
read,
altered,
o
r
re-
played.F
o
r
ex
am
ple,
a
m
alicious
co
m
petitor
co
uld
get
co
nfidentialinform
ation
o
r
ev
en
w
o
rser
co
uld
m
anipulate
inform
ation
lik
e
prices.
T
o
solv
e
these
problem
s,
w
e
present
an
authentication
and
authorization
architec-
ture
that
u
ses
secu
re
co
m
m
u
nication
channels
and
digital
signatures.
O
ther
secu
rity
issues
su
ch
as
ofhiding
services
o
rprev
entingdenial
of
service
attacks
are
n
ot
subject
to
thispaper
.
The
rest
of
thispaperis
o
rganized
asfollo
w
s:In
Section
2
w
e
giv
e
an
o
v
erview
of
related
w
o
rk
o
n
Jini
secu
rity
.
Section
3
giv
es
an
o
v
erview
of
secu
rity
in
distrib
uted
system
s
in
general,follo
w
ed
by
Section
4
w
here
w
e
look
at
secu
rity
issues
in
Jav
a
that
are
u
sed
in
Section
5
w
hich
also
introduces
o
u
r
approach.
Section
6
co
n
cludes
thispaper
and
pro
vides
an
o
utlook
o
n
future
w
o
rk.
2
R
elated
W
o
rk
W
e
kno
w
of
three
otherprojects
w
hich
also
pro
vide
a
secu
re
Jiniinfrastructure.P
asi
Eronen
sho
w
ed
in
his
m
asterthesis[3]ho
w
to
incorporate
Sim
ple
Public
K
ey
Infras-
tructure(SPKI)
into
a
Jini
secu
rity
solution.
H
asselm
eyer
,K
ehr
and
V
oß
put
their
focus
o
n
secu
ring
the
lookup
service[5].
The
third
solution
w
as
a
presentation
at
the
Jav
a
O
ne
2000
co
nference
by
Christopher
Steel,Senior
Jav
a
A
rchitect
atSun
M
icrosystem
s.
A
ll
of
them
u
se
signing
of
code
as
w
e
propose.
H
o
w
ev
er
,
they
do
n
otpro
vide
transparency
to
the
client
and
they
do
n
otpro
vide
a
m
ultifunctionalR
e-
m
oteCallbackH
andler
.In
o
u
r
architecture,
aR
em
oteCallbackH
andleris
a
rem
oteJav
a
object
at
client
side
that
can
in
v
ok
e
different
authentication
technologieslik
e
the
u
se
ofthe
so
-called
Jav
a
Ring.There
also
exists
aJini
secu
rity
hom
epage[10],
w
hereJini
secu
rity
relev
antproblem
s
are
discussed.
B
esides
Jini,
so
m
e
other
sim
iliar
system
s
existthatpro
vide
service
disco
v
ery
,for
ex
am
ple
U
niv
ersalPlug
and
Play
,N
inja,
eSpeak.
These
technologies
are
ev
aluated
and
co
m
pared
in
the
project
”Jini
and
Friends
atW
o
rk:
T
o
w
ards
secu
red
service
ac-
cess”,
w
hich
hasbeen
carried
o
utby
the
Eurescom
o
rganization[6].
3
Security
in
D
istrib
uted
C
om
puting
Security
can
be
seen
as
thefactthatprotection
goals
arefulfilled
in
spite
ofintellig
ent
attackers
.Security
goals
refer
to
the
typicalthreadsin
inform
ation
system
s:[14]

U
nauthorized
acquisition
ofinform
ation.(Security
goal:protection
of
co
nfiden-
tiality
of
co
ntentdata,trafficdata,
an
o
nym
ity
and
u
n
observ
ability
and
protection
2
oflocations
of
m
obile
u
sers.)

U
nauthorized
m
odification
ofinform
ation.(Securitygoal:protection
ofintegrity
of
co
ntentdata,
acco
u
ntability
of
sending
and/or
receiving
data
by
m
ean
s
of
digital
signatures
and
certificates,
and
protection
ofbilling
data.)

U
nauthorized
im
pairm
ent
offunctionality;(Security
goal:
protection
of
av
ail-
ablity
of
co
ntents
and
services
w
ithin
w
ell-defined
tim
e
co
n
straintsfor
all
autho-
rized
entities.)
Jini
servicespro
videfunctionality
in
an
open
en
vironm
ent
and
interact
spontaneously
w
ith
possibly
u
ntrusted
co
m
ponents
o
r
“visitors”.
Consequently
,
serious
attacks
by
m
alicious
clientshav
e
to
beblock
ed.
In
aJini-controlled
hom
e
en
vironm
entfor
ex
am
ple,the
o
w
n
er
ofthehouse
m
ay
be
allo
w
ed
to
co
ntrol
the
tem
perature
in
the
house
from
anyw
here(e.g.
InternetCafe)
by
calling
the
co
rresponding
Jini
service
of
the
house.O
n
the
otherhand
ithas
to
be
prev
ented
thatan
u
n
authorized
person
can
sw
itch
o
n
and
offheaters,lights,o
r
ev
en
the
alarm
system
ofthehouse.Therefore,an
identification
and
authentication
m
echanism
is
required.
M
oreo
v
er
,
the
children
of
the
fam
ily
m
ay
co
ntrol
the
tem
perature
of
the
anim
al’s
terrarium
b
ut
n
ot
of
the
w
hole
house.
Therefore,
an
authorization
and
rights
m
an
agem
ents
system
is
n
ecessary
.B
oth,
authentication
and
authorization
can
be
im
plem
ented
forJini
services
and
arebased
o
n
the
standard
Jav
a
secu
rity
classes.
Confidentiality
of
co
ntent
can
be
achiev
ed
by
en
cryption.T
echniques
to
protectthe
co
nfidentiality
of
traffic
data
as
w
ell
aslocations,
an
o
nym
ity
and
u
n
observ
ability
are
subsum
ed
u
nder
so
-called
priv
acy-enhancing-tech
n
ologies[4].
The
m
ajor
technology
that
realizes
integrity
and
acco
u
ntablity
are
digital
signa-
tures,
w
here
a
person
generates
a
k
ey
pair(a
priv
ate
and
a
co
rresponding
public
k
ey),
and
publishes
the
public
k
ey
.
N
o
w
,
ev
erybody
is
able
to
v
erify
w
hether
the
person
has
signed
a
docum
entby
applying
the
public
k
ey
and
the
docum
entto
a
v
erification
algorithm
.The
authenticity
ofthepublick
ey
,i.e.the
asso
ciation
oftheperson
and
the
individualpublick
ey
,isgiv
en
by
adigital
certificateissued
by
a
certification
authority
(CA).
4
J
a
v
a
Security
A
short
o
v
erview
ofJav
aSecurity
isgiv
en
in
thisSection,
since
Jiniisbased
o
n
Jav
a.
F
o
rfurtherinform
ation
aboutJav
aSecurity
,
w
e
referto
the
Jav
aSecurity
Site[11].
4.1
Security
in
O
lderJDK
V
ersions
W
ith
the
first
v
ersion
ofJav
a(JDK1.0),Sun
introduced
the
sandbox
m
odelin
w
hich
do
w
nloaded
code
has
restricted
access
to
any
reso
u
rce
o
utside
the
sandbox.JD
K
1.1
extended
the
sandbox
m
odel
w
ith
the
signing
of
code.
A
class
file
and
its
digital
signature
are
check
ed
at
client
side.
If
the
signer
of
the
code
is
trusted
and
the
sig-
n
ature
co
uld
be
v
erified,the
Jav
a
appletgets
the
sam
e
perm
issions
as
a
local
class.
If
the
signer
of
the
code
is
n
ottrusted
o
r
the
signature
is
n
ot
v
alid,the
applet
w
illbe
ex
ecuted
in
the
sandbox
o
nly
.
4.2
Security
in
JDK
1.2
JD
K
1.2
introduced
fine
grained
access
co
ntrol
to
all
secu
rity
relev
ant
reso
u
rces.
It
u
ses
P
e
r
mission
classes
and
subtypes
ofit
to
represent
the
right
to
access
a
re-
so
u
rce,
e.g.
n
e
w
FilePermission
("c:\config.sys",
"
r
e
ad")
repre-
sents
the
perm
ission
to
access
the
file
c
:\config.sys
for
reading
o
nly
.
These
perm
issions
can
be
granted
o
n
the
basis
ofthe
codebase,by
w
hich
the
code
is
signed
o
r
w
ithout
any
restrictions.That
m
ean
s
the
sandbox
m
odel
and
the
explicitdistinction
betw
een
local
and
do
w
nloaded
code
is
n
o
longer
n
eeded,because
thefunctionality
of
the
older
m
odelsis
a
subset
ofthe
n
ew
o
n
e.A
so
-called
k
ey
store
is
u
sed
to
store
the
priv
ate
signing
k
eys
and
the
certificated
public
v
erification
k
eysfordigital
signatures.
T
o
specify
w
here
the
k
ey
store
islocated
and
w
hich
perm
issions
are
granted,
a
policy
fileis
u
sed
w
hich
can
be
an
argum
entto
theJV
M
o
r
referenced
by
thedefault
secu
rity
settings.
3
4.3
Security
in
JDK
1.3
Based
o
n
JA
A
S
G
ranting
perm
issionsin
JD
K
1.2
isbased
o
n
w
here
the
code
isfrom
and
w
ho
signed
the
code.Jav
a
A
uthentication
and
A
uthorization
Service(JA
A
S)is
a
standard
exten-
sion
to
theJD
K
1.3.JA
A
S
extends
theJD
K
1.2
co
n
ceptby
granting
perm
issionsbased
o
n
w
hich
behalf
the
code
is
ex
ecuted.
It
also
co
ntains
m
odules
to
log
o
n
the
u
ser
.
JA
A
S
is
based
o
n
the
Pluggable
A
uthentication
M
odules(PA
M
)
fram
ew
o
rk
w
hich
defines
an
A
PIfor
applications
to
log
o
n
u
sers.
Thus,
ev
ery
application
can
u
se
the
PA
M
fram
ew
o
rk
w
hich
can
be
co
nfigured
by
an
adm
inistrator
.Consequently
,PA
M
is
independent
of
w
hich
application
u
sesthe
authentication
m
echanism
s
and
co
nfiguring
the
authentication
policy
can
bedone
separately
.
4.3.1
Subjects
a
nd
Principals
S
ubject
s
and
P
rincipal
s
are
u
sed
to
representtheidentity
of
an
u
ser
and
herlo-
gin
n
am
es.Thedistinction
betw
een
S
ubjects
and
P
rincipal
sis
v
ery
im
portant
because
a
u
ser
can
hav
e
differentlogin
n
am
esfordifferent
services.That
m
ean
s
that
a
u
serhas
a
collection
ofdifferentlogin
n
am
es.
PA
M
dem
ands
thatthe
login
procedure
is
independent
of
the
authentication
tech-
n
ology
,i.e.
w
hich
authentication
technology
is
u
sed.F
o
r
thatpurpose,JA
A
S
defines
a
L
o
ginContext
and
a
L
o
ginModule
.
A
L
o
ginModule
represents
o
n
e
authentication
technology
,
e.g.
u
ser
n
am
e
pass-
w
o
rd
authentication(figure
1).Ev
ery
authentication
technology
m
u
stim
plem
entthe
tw
o
phase
protocol
–
sim
ilar
to
the
tw
o
phase
transaction
protocol
u
sed
by
Jini’s
T
ran
saction
M
anager
–
w
hich
w
illbe
in
v
ok
ed
by
the
L
o
ginContext
,the
central
m
an
ager
ofthe
login
process.
JA
A
S
pro
vides
a
stackable
authentication
fram
ew
o
rk.
That
m
ean
s
m
ultiple
L
o
ginModule
s
can
be
specified
in
a
login
policy
file(figure
1).
Subject
Login
Context
Set
Callback
H
andler
Login
Config
File
(1)
Principal
Login
M
odule
(2)
Credentials
Set
(4)
(3)
looks up
invokes
invokes
interacts
with
(5) returns
Figure
1:JA
A
S
co
n
cepts
and
classes.
4.4
Signed
C
ode
in
J
a
v
a
A
co
m
m
o
n
problem
ofdynam
ically
loaded
codeis
the
u
n
aw
aren
ess,w
hetherthe
code
does
w
hatitis
expected
to
do,
especially
w
hetheritdoes
n
otperform
any
m
alicious
actions.
F
o
r
thatpurpose
Jav
a
u
ses
digital
signature
of
code.
This
en
su
res
that
an
attack
er
can
n
ot
replace
code
in
an
u
n
n
oticed
w
ay
.
W
e
m
ak
e
tw
o
assu
m
ptions
about
signed
code:

the
signer
ofthe
code
k
eepsherpriv
ate
signing
k
ey
secret;

the
signerguarantees
thatby
u
sing
the
signed
code,the
u
serdoes
n
ot
sufferfrom
any
m
alicious
actions,
e.g.
transm
itting
secretdata
w
ithout
en
cryption
o
v
er
an
insecure
channellik
e
the
Internet.
These
assu
m
ptions
are
also
m
ade
by
Jav
a
fordo
w
nloaded
code.
Thisim
plies
that
4
the
u
ser
has
to
trust
the
signer
and
has
to
v
erify
the
v
alidity
o
r
co
rrectness
of
the
certificate
thatthe
u
ser
utilizes
to
v
erify
thedigital
signature
ofthe
code.
These
assu
m
ptionsdo
n
ot
o
v
erload
the
actual
sem
antic
of
signed
code.Itis
ex
actly
the
w
ay
Jav
aintends
signed
code
to
beinterpreted:the
sem
antic
o
nly
guarantees
w
hat
the
code
is
n
otdoing,it
says
n
othing
about
w
hatthe
code
is
ex
catly
doing.
Thisfits
perfectly
in
o
u
r
m
odel
w
here
the
authentication
procedure
is
transparentto
the
client.
If
authentication
is
u
sed,
and
the
u
ser
trusts
the
signer
,the
code
is
expected
to
do
n
o
m
alicious
actions
w
hich
co
uld
harm
the
u
ser’sinterests.
Itis
up
to
both
partiesho
w
the
u
sergets
the
certificatefrom
the
o
w
n
er
.Itis
also
up
to
the
u
serifhe
trusts
a
self-signed
certificate.In
that
case,the
certificateis
o
nly
u
sed
as
a
co
ntainerfor
the
public
k
ey
.Itis
also
possible
to
dem
and
thatthe
certificate
has
to
be
signed
by
a
trusted
CA
.
4.5
Encryption
in
J
a
v
a
W
e
u
se
theJav
aCryptography
A
rchitecture(JCA)thatpro
vides
sev
eral
classes
w
hich
m
ak
e
itpossible
to
en
crypt
and
decryptJav
a
objects.
JCA
pro
vides
cryptographic
prim
itiv
esindependently
of
a
certain
im
plem
entation.Itdefines
an
A
pplication
Pro-
gram
m
ing
Interface
of
a
cryptographic
function(e.g.
en
cryption,hash
function,
ran
-
dom
generator)by
m
ean
s
of
an
Engine
class.
The
actualim
plem
entation
of
the
prim
itiv
es
are
pro
vided
by
a
Cryptographic
Ser
-
vice
Pro
vider(CSP).Thus,itispossible
to
w
o
rk
w
ith
an
abstract
en
cryption
function
o
n
the
application
lev
el.Theprogram
m
erdoes
n
ot
care
aboutdetails
su
ch
as
theblock
size
of
a
cipher
,ho
w
k
ey
generation
is
realized,
o
r
ev
en
w
hich
algorithm
is
u
sed.
5
A
n
A
rchitecure
fo
rSecured
Service
A
ccess
A
s
m
entioned
in
Section
1,w
epresent
a
solution
to
three
secu
rity
problem
s
w
hich
Jini
does
n
ot
address.Firstly
,Jinihas
n
o
authentication
and
authorization
m
echanism
s,
so
that
u
ntrusted
parties
can
u
se
any
service
o
n
the
n
et.
Secondly
,
re-registration
of
u
ntrusted
service
proxies
is
possible
w
hich
opens
the
door
for
m
an
-in-the-m
iddle-
attacks.
A
nd
thirdly
,
the
n
etw
o
rk
pack
ets
that
are
required
for
the
co
m
m
u
nication
betw
een
Jini
entities
can
be
read,
altered,
replayed,
o
rdeleted.
This
section
pro
vides
ahigh
lev
el
o
v
erview
of
o
u
r
architecture
that
sho
w
s
a
solution
to
theseproblem
s.A
firstprototypeis
up
and
ru
n
ning,and
includes
sm
artcard
authen-
tication(Jav
a
Ring).The
system
isb
uilt
o
n
standard
offthe
shelfJav
a
technology
and
has
the
follo
w
ing
characteristics:

U
sesJA
A
S
1.0,JD
K
1.3,JIN
I1.0.1,JCE
1.2.1,Jav
aCard
2.0,

T
ran
sparentto
the
client:
existing
clientsdo
n
othav
e
to
be
m
odified,

Introduces
m
inim
al
o
v
erhead
at
serv
er
side,

Pro
videspo
w
erfullogin
policies
that
allo
w
flexible
authentication
schem
es,

A
ll
secu
rity
infrastructure
co
m
ponents
areb
uilt
asJini
services,

Pro
vides
authorization
m
echanism
s(JA
A
S
1.0
+
Jav
a
Security
A
rchitecture).
5.1
Service
A
uthentication
a
nd
A
uthorization
Ev
ery
service
has
to
authenticate
and
authorize
each
client
request.The
clienthas
to
m
ak
e
su
re
thatitis
ru
n
ning
o
nly
signed
code
from
a
trusted
so
u
rce.
5.2
Login
P
olicies
A
u
ser
should
interact
as
little
as
possible
w
ith
the
login
infrastructure,
therefore
a
single
sign-on
approach
is
u
sed
w
here
appropriate.
Especially
in
the
hom
e
en
viron-
m
ent,
u
sers
typically
do
n
ot
w
antto
authenticate
them
selv
es,
w
hen
they
turn
o
n
the
light.
The
login
policy
should
be
as
flexible
as
possible.
D
ifferent
services
in
different
en
vironm
ents
can
specify
differentpolicies
to
log
o
n
the
u
ser
.F
o
r
ex
am
ple,
a
u
ser
at
5
hom
e
can
turn
o
n
thelights
w
ithout
authentication,in
her
office
shehas
to
enter
a
u
ser
n
am
e
and
passw
o
rd
to
turn
o
n
the
lights
athom
e
and
o
n
the
Internet
she
m
ay
hav
e
to
authenticateherself
u
sing
a
Jav
a
Ring.
5.3
C
lientT
ra
n
sparen
cy
The
secu
rity
infrastructure
should
be
transparent
to
the
clientim
plem
entation.
Ex-
isting
clients
do
n
othav
e
to
be
changed
in
o
rder
to
u
se
the
secu
rity
infrastructure.
The
u
serdoes
n
othav
e
to
specify
the
authentication
m
ethod.This
w
illbedeterm
ined
through
the
login
policy
at
ru
ntim
e
by
the
system
.
5.4
A
rchitecture
N
ext,
w
edescribeho
w
thesegoals
are
achiev
ed.The
architecture
co
n
sists
ofdifferent
Jini
services
thatim
plem
entthe
secu
rity
infrastructure.
5.4.1
C
lient
In
o
rderto
achiev
e
clienttransparency
,all
secu
rity-related
functionality
ispack
ed
into
the
service
proxy
.The
client
u
ses
the
published
interface
of
the
service
asifit
w
ere
an
insecure
service.
T
o
en
su
re
that
the
client
o
nly
u
ses
trusted
service
proxies,
the
secu
rity
settings
at
client
sidehav
e
to
be
changed,
so
thatthe
clients
can
o
nly
ru
n
code
from
trusted
so
u
rces.These
settings
are
transparentto
Jini,
since
the
ev
aluation
ofthe
secu
rity
settings
is
done
by
the
co
re
Jav
a
classes
in
the
background.
This
approach
solv
es
the
problem
of
m
an
-in-the-m
iddle-attacks,
since
a
re-registered
service
proxy
co
uld
n
otbe
digitally
signed
w
ith
the
o
rginal
service’s
signing
k
ey
and
therefore
the
signature
check
at
client
side
thatisdoneby
the
co
re
Jav
a
classes
w
ill
realize
thatthe
re-registered
service
proxy
is
n
otdigitally
signed
o
r
thatitis
digitally
signed
by
an
u
nkno
w
n
party
.
5.4.2
Service
Pro
xy
a
nd
Service
Back
end
U
pon
service
disco
v
ery
,the
clientloads
the
appropriate
service
proxy
from
the
Jini
Lookup
service
that
in
turn
co
m
m
u
nicates
w
ith
the
service
back
end.
T
o
pro
vide
priv
acy
and
to
prev
ent
replays,
w
e
u
se
sym
m
etric
en
cryption
of
the
data,
a
m
es-
sage
authentication
code
and
add
a
transaction
n
u
m
ber
.
The
sym
m
etric
en
cryption
is
achiev
ed
u
sing
the
D
iffie
H
ellm
an
k
ey
agreem
ent
schem
e:
the
back
end
service
generatesitspublic
and
priv
ate
k
eys,the
priv
ate
k
ey
rem
ains
atthe
back
end
service,
the
public
k
ey
w
illbe
transferred
to
the
service
proxy
.A
fter
a
proxy
hasbeen
do
w
n
-
loaded
by
the
client,
the
proxy
generates
its
o
w
n
priv
ate
and
public
k
eys
and
w
ith
its
o
w
n
priv
ate
k
ey
and
the
back
end’s
public
k
ey
,itgenerates
the
sym
m
etric
secret
session
k
ey
and
sends
its
public
k
ey
back
to
the
back
end,
so
that
the
back
end
can
generate
the
sym
m
etric
secretk
ey
w
hich
w
illbe
stored
in
a
session
database.
Since
the
client
ru
n
s
o
nly
signed
and
trusted
code,
and
the
co
m
m
u
nication
betw
een
service
proxy
and
service
back
end
is
secu
re
u
sing
the
m
echanism
described
abo
v
e,
the
seco
nd
of
the
three
problem
sis
solv
ed,
n
am
ely
priv
acy
is
achiev
ed
and
replaying
and
changing
ofdata
betw
een
the
client
and
the
serv
erisprev
ented.
5.4.3
Interaction
Schem
e
ofthe
Infrastructure
In
thefollo
w
ing,itisdescribed
ho
w
authentication
and
authorization
can
be
achiev
ed
u
sing
the
abo
v
e
infrastructure,
see
figure
2.
Thisis
also
the
solution
to
the
third
and
lastproblem
.
W
e
put
o
u
r
m
ain
focus
o
n
thatproblem
,
since
itis
the
m
o
st
co
m
ple
x
o
n
e.U
pon
service
in
v
o
cation,
the
service
back
end
co
ntacts
a
Jini
ser
-
vice
called
SubjectAuthenticatorService
w
hich
returns
a
Subject
object
introduced
in
JD
K
1.3
/
JA
A
S
1.0.
It
is
up
to
the
SubjectAuthenticatorService
ho
w
to
generate
the
Subject
.
In
the
reference
im
plem
entation,
w
e
u
sed
the
JA
A
S
technology
,
because
it
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2:Com
ponents
ofthe
secu
rity
architecture.
is
already
av
ailable
and
it
is
easily
extendible
to
be
u
sed
in
a
distrib
uted
en
vironm
ent.

The
S
ubjectAuthenticatorService
gets
the
inform
ation
to
w
hich
ser
-
vice
the
u
ser
w
ants
to
log
o
n
including
the
n
u
m
ber
of
attem
pts
the
u
ser
has
perform
ed
already
and
from
w
hich
device
the
u
ser
w
ants
to
log
o
n
.W
ith
thisin-
form
ation
the
S
ubjectAuthenticatorService
co
ntacts
the
login
policy
database:
L
o
ginPolicyDB
.This
can
be
a
separateJIN
I
service
o
r
can
beb
uilt
in
the
ServiceA
uthenticatorService.

The
L
o
ginPolicyDB
returns
a
L
o
ginPolicy
w
hich
specifies
a
policy
of
ho
w
to
authenticate
the
u
ser
.
N
o
w
the
SubjectAuthenticatorService
co
ntacts
a
R
e
m
o
t
e
C
allbackHandler
w
hich
w
as
instantiated
by
the
service
proxy
at
client
side.
D
epending
o
n
the
login
policy
,
the
R
e
m
o
t
e
C
allbackHandler
can
prom
ptfor
a
u
ser
n
am
e
and
passw
o
rd,
o
r
initiate
ev
en
m
o
re
co
m
ple
x
authentication
schem
es.

The
R
e
m
o
t
e
C
allbackHandler
m
ay
co
ntact
a
JIN
I
RingAuthenticationService
w
hich
in
turn
co
ntacts
a
JIN
I
BlueDotService
to
ru
n
a
challenge
response
applet
o
n
a
Jav
a
Ring,
for
ex
am
ple.
A
BlueDotService
pro
vides
the
functionality
of
a
Jav
a
Ring
readerthatis
also
kno
w
n
asBlue
D
otR
eceptor
.

A
fter
the
R
e
m
o
t
e
C
allbackHandler
has
receiv
ed
the
result
of
the
authentication
procedure,
the
inform
ation
is
sent
back
to
the
SubjectAuthenticatorService
w
hich
co
ntacts
a
u
ser
database,
U
s
e
r
D
B
,
w
hich
again
can
be
a
JIN
I
service
o
r
b
uilt
in
the
SubjectAuthenticatorService
.

The
U
s
e
r
D
B
checksif
allthedatais
co
rrect
and
returns
thedata
n
eeded
to
b
uild
a
Subject
.
B
ased
o
n
this
data
the
SubjectAuthenticatorService
b
uilds
the
Subject
and
returnsitto
the
service.

The
service
finally
stores
the
Subject
in
its
co
ntextinform
ation
and
returns
a
tok
en
to
the
service
proxy
,to
be
u
sed
by
the
clientthatis
u
sed
transparently
for
ev
ery
service
in
v
o
cation.This
co
m
pletes
the
authentication
procedure.

T
o
perform
actions
that
n
eed
authorization,
the
service
ru
n
s
the
Subject.doAs()
m
ethods
for
the
client.
This
m
ethod
checks,
if
the
appropriate
perm
issions
hav
e
been
granted
to
the
giv
en
Subject.
If
n
ot,
an
ex
ception
w
illbe
thro
w
n
.
7
5.4.4
A
nonym
ous
a
nd
SingleSign-on
T
o
faciliate
the
sign-on,
an
other
tw
o
co
n
cepts
are
u
sed.A
tfirstglance,it
m
ay
so
u
nd
co
ntradictory
,b
ut
an
o
nym
ous
sign-on
can
be
u
sefulin
m
any
hom
e
en
vironm
ent
sce-
n
arios.
F
o
r
ex
am
ple,
a
light
sw
itch
inside
a
ro
o
m
should
be
u
sable
by
anyone
w
ho
isin
the
ro
o
m
w
ithout
authentication
to
turn
the
light
o
n
,b
ut
so
m
eo
n
e
in
an
Internet
Cafe
m
u
stbe
authenticated
if
she
w
ants
to
turn
o
n
the
light.F
o
r
this
reaso
n
the
light
sw
itch
tries
to
log
o
n
asD
efaultU
ser
and
a
challenge
response
procedure
v
erifies
the
identity
ofthe
light
sw
itch
asD
efaultU
ser
.
A
nother
sim
plification
is
the
single
sign-on
approach.
That
m
ean
s
to
log
o
n
o
n
e
service
and
to
u
se
other
services
w
ithoutfurther
authentication.This
w
o
rksby
giving
o
utLoginT
ok
en
s
w
hich
are
stored
transparently
at
client
side.T
o
prev
entlog
o
n
ser
-
vices
w
hich
require
w
eak
authentication
and
u
se
theirLoginT
ok
en
s
to
log
o
n
services
w
hich
require
strong
authentication,
ev
ery
LoginPolicy
defines
an
imply()
m
ethod,
w
hich
defines
w
hatLoginPolicy
are
equalto
o
r
strongerthan
the
cu
rrentLoginPolicy
.
The
u
se
ofboth
co
n
ceptsis
optional.O
nly
if
they
are
explicitliy
listed
in
a
Login-
Policy
co
nfiguration,they
are
u
sed
by
the
secu
rity
infrastructure.
5.5
C
om
parision
w
ith
theC
O
R
BA
Security
Service
CO
RBA
is
a
m
iddlew
areplatform
for
rem
otein
v
o
cation
of
objects.M
oreinform
ation
o
n
CO
RBA
are
av
ailable
at
the
O
M
G
hom
epage[7].
CO
RBA
u
ses
O
bjectR
equest
B
rok
ers(ORBs)
o
n
client
and
serv
er
side
thathandle
the
rem
ote
in
v
o
cation
transpar
-
ently
forthe
client
and
serv
er
object.Exactly
the
sam
e
secu
rity
problem
s
thatJinihas
to
cope
w
ith
its
services,
m
u
stbe
handled
by
CO
RBA
o
n
objectlev
el.
CO
RBA
’s
secu
rity
service
[8]
is
transparent
to
the
client
and
the
service,
since
itis
in
v
ok
ed
by
the
O
RB,thatin
turn
perform
s
the
in
v
o
cation
transparently
for
the
client
and
the
service.In
o
u
r
architecture,
w
e
can
achiev
e
transparency
for
the
client
o
nly
,
since
o
n
e
of
o
u
rgoals
is
n
otto
change
the
u
nderlaying
infrastructure.
B
utthe
o
v
erhead
at
serv
er
side
is
m
inim
al.
Lik
e
in
CO
RBA
,
the
secu
rity
policies
can
be
m
an
aged
by
an
adm
inistratorindependently
ofthe
application.
A
uthentication
of
u
sers
o
r
system
entities
isdone
at
client
side
and
itis
up
to
the
actualim
plem
entation
of
the
secu
rity
service
ho
w
to
achiev
e
this.
F
o
r
this
reaso
n
the
rem
ote
O
RB
m
u
st
establish
trustbetw
een
itself
and
the
clientO
RB
that
again
n
eeds
extra
adm
inistration.
In
o
u
r
approach
the
authentication
of
u
sers
is
driv
en
by
the
service
side.U
serinteraction
schem
es
are
perform
ed
at
client
side,b
utthedatais
check
ed
at
service
side.
W
e
think
o
u
r
approach
is
m
o
re
u
seful,
since
a
bank
service
for
ex
am
pledoes
n
ot
w
antto
trust
allthe
clientO
RBs
o
n
allthe
hom
e
co
m
puters.
A
uthorization
in
CO
RBA
is
also
based
o
n
an
authenticated
u
ser
.
Its
authorization
m
odelis
m
o
re
co
m
ple
x
than
the
o
n
e
u
sed
in
o
u
r
architecture,b
utithas
the
sam
e
expressiv
epo
w
er
.A
ccess
checks
areperform
ed
by
theinfrastructurein
both
architec-
tures.
CO
RBA
’s
secu
rity
serviceim
plem
entations
m
ay
also
pro
videdelegation
so
thatthe
serv
er
object
can
act
as
the
calling
client
object.
W
e
also
integrated
the
basics
for
delegation
and
a
finer
m
odelis
cu
rrently
u
nderdev
elopm
ent.
In
general,delegation
can
be
of
u
se,b
ut
an
adm
inistratorhas
to
do
extra
w
o
rk
to
co
nfiguredelegation
rights
and
itispossible
fordelegates
to
m
isuse
theirdelegated
rights.
T
w
o
other
co
n
cepts
ofCO
RBA
are
auditing
and
n
o
n
-repudation.
B
oth
co
n
cepts
refer
to
acco
u
ntability
and
the
latteris
optionalin
CO
RBA
.W
e
hav
e
n
otfocused
o
n
acco
u
ntability
,since
this
can
be
easly
added
to
o
u
r
architecture.
5.5.1
Sum
m
ary
ofU
sed
J
a
v
a
Security
F
eatures
T
o
im
plem
entthe
presented
architecture,
w
e
u
sed
so
m
e
classes
of
the
JCA
.The
fol-
lo
w
ing
su
m
m
ary
giv
es
an
o
v
erview
of
allk
eys
and
classes
u
sed
in
o
u
rim
plem
entation.
The
follo
w
ing
k
eys
are
u
sed:

priv
ate
signing
k
eys,
stored
in
the
k
ey
store
at
service
back
end
side,
u
sed
to
sign
static
code
and
dynam
ic
data,
created
together
w
ith
the
certificate
w
ith
the
co
m
m
and
line
program
keytool
at
service
back
end
side;
8
self
signed
certificate
co
ntaining
the
public
v
erifying
k
ey
,
stored
in
the
k
ey
store
at
client
side,
u
sed
to
v
erify
signed
code
and
dynam
ically
signed
data,
created
together
w
ith
the
co
m
m
and
line
program
keytool
at
serviceback
end
side;

priv
ate
D
iffie
H
ellm
an(DH)k
ey
,
created
dynam
ically
together
w
ith
the
public
D
H
k
ey
o
n
both
sides,
stored
locally
,
n
eeded
for
creation
of
a
secretk
ey;

public
D
H
k
ey
,
created
dynam
ically
together
w
ith
the
priv
ate
D
H
k
ey
o
n
both
sides,
the
service
back
end
signs
it
and
puts
itin
the
service
proxy
,the
service
proxy
sendsit
u
n
signed
to
the
service
back
end;

secretk
ey
,
created
dynam
ically
o
n
both
sides
w
ith
the
o
w
n
priv
ate
D
H
k
ey
and
thepublic
D
H
k
ey
from
the
other
side,
u
sed
to
en
crypt
and
decryptdata
sym
m
et-
rically
and
to
co
m
pute
a
M
essage
A
uthentication
Code(M
A
C).
The
follo
w
ing
classes
of
thejava.security
andjavax.crypto
p
a
ckages
are
u
sed:

Cipher
,u
sed
to
en
crypt
and
decryptdata,n
eeds
the
secretk
ey
forinitialization;
input
and
o
utput
arebyte
arrays,

S
e
aledObject
,u
sed
to
en
crypt
and
decryptJav
a
objects,
n
eeds
a
serializable
object
and
a
Cipher
objectfor
en
cryption,
n
eeds
the
secretk
ey
fordecryption,

K
e
y
A
g
r
e
e
m
e
n
t
,u
sed
to
co
m
pute
a
secretk
ey
thatis
o
nly
kno
w
nby
tw
o
parties
o
v
er
an
insecure
channel,
requires
the
o
w
n
priv
ate
D
H
k
ey
and
the
otherpublic
D
H
k
ey
,

K
e
y
P
airGenerator
,u
sed
to
generate
a
pair
ofpublic
and
priv
atek
eys,
u
sed
here
to
generate
the
priv
ate
and
the
public
D
H
k
ey
,

Signature
,u
sed
to
co
m
pute
and
to
v
erify
adigital
signature,
n
eeds
thepriv
ate
signing
k
ey
o
rthepublic
v
erifying
k
ey
forinitialization,input
and
o
utputarebyte
arrays,

SignedObject
,
u
sed
to
sign
and
v
erify
signatures
o
n
Jav
a
objects,
n
eeds
a
serializable
object,thepriv
ate
signing
k
ey
and
a
Signature
objectfor
signing,
n
eeds
the
public
v
erification
k
ey
and
a
Signature
objectfor
v
erification,

K
e
y
s
t
o
r
e
,u
sed
to
store
and
retriev
epriv
atek
eys
and
public
certificatespersis-
tently
,n
eeds
an
I
n
p
u
tSt
ream
and
optional
ak
ey
storepassw
o
rd
forinitializa-
tion,
n
eeds
an
alias
to
retriev
epublic
certificates
and
priv
atek
eys,
w
hereaslatter
n
eeds
a
passw
o
rd
obligatory
to
access,
u
sed
here
to
store
the
priv
ate
signing
k
ey
and
the
public
v
erifying
k
ey
inside
a
certificate,

M
a
c
,
u
sed
to
guarantee
the
integrity
of
a
m
essage,
n
eeds
the
secretk
ey
forini-
tialization,
u
sed
here
to
guarantee
the
integrity
ofthe
en
crypted
data.
6
C
onclusion
The
secu
rity
enhancem
entsdescribed
in
thispaperpro
vide
the
follo
w
ing
adv
antages.
The
solution
b
uilds
o
n
top
of
the
JiniA
PI,
so
that
m
odifications
to
the
JiniA
PI
are
n
ot
n
ecessary
.O
nly
standard
Jav
a
packages
and
n
o
proprietary
softw
are
is
u
sed.The
o
v
erhead
to
im
plem
ent
a
secu
re
Jini
service
co
m
pared
to
the
im
plem
entation
of
a
n
o
rm
alinsecure
Jini
service
is
m
inim
al.
That
m
ean
s
rapid
creation
of
n
ew
secu
re
Jini
services
and
an
abstract
view
ofthe
u
nderlaying
secu
rity
infrastructure.A
t
client
side,the
secu
rity
infrastructure
is
transparentto
any
Jini
client.
A
n
already
existing
Jini
clientdoes
n
ot
n
eed
to
be
m
odified
ifthe
secu
rity
of
a
servicehas
to
beim
pro
v
ed.
The
authors
think
that
the
transparency
for
the
Jini
clientis
an
im
portantdesign
decision,
since
the
Jini
client
co
uld
n
ot
w
eak
en
the
secu
rity
policy
at
service
side.
A
notherbenefitis
the
faster
creation
of
n
ew
Jini
clients,
since
n
o
secu
rity
issueshav
e
to
be
handled
by
the
program
m
er
.B
utthere
also
exists
an
other
view
.The
Jav
a
R
M
I
9
Security
Specification
pro
vides
–
b
uilding
o
n
JA
A
S
–
authentication,integrity
,
co
nfi-
dentiality
and
delegation
forJav
a
R
em
ote
M
ethod
In
v
o
cation
in
general.Lik
e
Jini,it
also
u
ses
a
service
proxy
client
co
n
cept.The
m
ain
difference
is
that
all
secu
rity
co
n
-
cepts
can
be
n
egotiated
betw
een
the
service
and
the
client.A
ccordingly
,the
clientis
aw
are
of
secu
rity
and
the
program
m
er
m
u
stdeal
w
ith
it.That
m
ean
s
thedev
elopm
ent
of
client
softw
areis
m
o
re
co
m
ple
x
.
A
notherim
portantfactis
the
signing
of
code.In
o
u
r
architecture,the
service
signs
the
service
proxy
code
and
itsdata
so
thatthe
JV
M
at
client
side
can
check
w
hether
the
service
is
trustw
o
rthy
.The
R
M
I
solution
does
n
ot
u
se
this
co
n
cept,
since
signing
of
codedoes
n
otguarantee
thatthe
service
really
supportsintegrity
o
r
co
nfidentiality
,
although
signed
applets
w
hich
can
bedo
w
nloaded
hav
e
the
sam
e
sem
antic
of
signing.
The
sem
anticis
thattheintegrity
ofthe
signed
applet
co
uld
be
v
erified
and
theidentity
of
the
signeriskno
w
n
.So
if
the
issueris
trustw
o
rthy
,the
signed
code
is
trustw
o
rthy
,
too.
The
issuerguarantees
that
allJav
a
code
does
n
otharm
the
u
sers
interests(e.g.
does
n
otdelete
files
o
r
send
co
nfidentaldata
o
v
er
an
insecure
channel).
This
can
n
ot
be
technically
achiev
ed,b
utit
co
uld
be
a
legal
co
ntract.
Ev
en
Jav
a
applets
in
the
Internetbanking
en
vironm
ent
u
se
this
co
n
cept
of
signed
code
to
establish
a
secu
re
co
m
m
u
nication
channel.
F
o
r
these
reaso
n
s,
w
e
think
that
o
u
r
architecture
is
a
suitable
basis
to
secu
re
Jini
applications.The
so
u
rce
code
of
o
u
r
reference
im
plem
entation
can
bedo
w
nloaded
at
http://www.inf.ethz.ch/˜schoch/ja
a
a
.
zi
p
.O
ne
aspect
of
o
u
rfuture
w
o
rk
is
to
putthe
cryptography
w
o
rk
o
n
so
ck
etlev
el.A
ccordingly
,the
secu
rity
archi-
tecture
w
o
uld
also
be
transparentto
the
service,
ex
ceptthe
initilization
ofthe
service.
A
nother
aspectis
to
secu
re
ev
ents
and
leases,
w
hich
co
uld
be
achiev
ed
in
a
sim
ilar
w
ay
.
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